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Digital technologies have created a new environment in the virtual world, which may 
either reinforce or undermine state authority. The wave of protests that erupted in the 
North African region during the last decade has increased the interest of scholars in 
investigating the catalysts for these uprisings. While there are conflicting views about the 
role of new technology in social protest, the Arab Spring has highlighted the role played 
by social media as a key tool in garner mass mobilization. However, a number of other 
factors could have been involved in the Arab uprisings. Thus, focusing only on one 
particular cause may lead to incorrect conclusions. Using cross-sectional-time series data, 
and multivariate regression, this thesis seeks to demonstrate that the Internet has a direct 
relationship with the onset of civil protests in Africa when certain economic conditions 
exist.  
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Internet usage has exploded over the past decade, transforming the global political 
and economic environment. Distance is no more a barrier to reaching isolated corners of 
the globe. Mobile devices allow individuals to view current events, interact, and spread 
news faster to other networks. Real-time images of oppressive government activities and 
violation of human rights can now be instantly viewed by the world. Broader audiences 
can now be reached at greater speed and relatively low cost, bridging new ideas, people 
and organizations, states, and social movements. At the same time, covert and illegal 
activities operating in the virtual space have also proliferated with these new 
technologies. The rise of Internet activities and penetration has multiplied social 
movement activities online.  
Activists and organizers of all stripes have been increasingly using such 
communication tools to spread information, and the ICT revolution has drastically 
changed the operating modes of social movements. The development of the Internet has 
permitted activists to move from the traditional mode of disseminating information to 
new forms of communication that prompt instantaneous participatory dialogue. Seth 
Kreimer argues that the presence of social movements has multiplied on the Internet, 
which allows them to present huge volumes of information that would not have been 
possible with traditional media outlets.1 Furthermore, the web allows activists to mobilize 
sympathizers and members to participate in their causes. Using Internet resources, 
movement organizers are able to reach larger crowds at relatively high speed through 
applications that generate bulk messages and sent them automatically to interested 
viewers who share the same concern.2  
The Internet also has significantly increased the potential for social movement 
organizations to become more autonomous and influential. The emergence of interactive 
social media such as Facebook and Twitter allows users to generate and exchange 
1. Seth F. Kreimer, “Technologies of Protest: Insurgent Social Movements and the First Amendment 
in the Era of the Internet,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 150, no. 1(2001): 126.            
2. Ibid., 134. 
1 
content, which ultimately strengthens the ties between social networks and enhances 
mobility, thus enabling “instant modes of mediated exchange.”3 Stephanie Alice Baker 
referred to this social phenomenon as the “mediated crowd” and argues that “the 
mediated crowd pertains to collective action that emerges in the virtual space (and 
geographic) arena as opposed to traditional crowd, which is typically limited to physical 
congregation in a shared geographical location.”4  
In social protests, collective action has always been the key determinant for the 
success of a movement, and social media may play a key role in mitigating in-group 
coordination and interaction problems. While governments have always struggled to 
control or influence media outlets, they have even greater difficulty controlling the virtual 
space and oppressive regimes during period of unrest often shut down access to the 
Internet in order to block social media activity. 
In recent decades, social protests have erupted in rich as well as poor countries. In 
the post-colonial era and with the end of the Cold War, the number of politically 
motivated social protests has dramatically increased. In Africa, bad governance, a weak 
economy, and fragile social structures have contributed to ongoing violence and social 
upheaval. Civil war is still raging and destroying the very fabric of society, and 
increasing distrust among the communities in many parts of Africa. Civil unrest has been 
a prominent feature of African society, and the wave of civil disorder occurring in many 
parts of the globe has exacerbated the situation in Africa.5 According to recent research 
new communication technology has boosted the economy in Africa but it has also 
contributed to more collective violence. In a 2013 study, Jan H. Pierskalla and Florian M. 
Hollenbach showed that the increase in cell phone technology can help rebel groups to 
3. Stephanie Alice Baker, “From the Criminal Crowd to the “Mediated Crowd”: The Impact of Social 
Media on the 2011 English Riots,” Safer Communities 11, no. 1 (2012): 44.                                                                                                                             
4. Ibid., 44 
5. Michael Bratton and Nicolas Van de Walle, “Popular Protest and Political Reform in Africa,” 
Comparative Politics 24, no. 4 (1992): 419.                                                                                                                          
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overcome collective action problems, which has a positive effect on the probability of 
conflict occurrence.6  
The fight for freedom and democracy has been a consistent feature of African 
politics, in countries long ruled by tyrannical leaders. The Afrobarometer public opinion 
survey shows that the majority of Africans want democracy instead of one-party rule.7 
Contrastingly, over the decades, there have been few indicators showing that most 
African countries are moving toward more democratic regimes. Authoritarian leaders 
backed by their militaries constantly attempt to inhibit any opposing force threatening 
their monopoly on power. At the same time, we see a number of examples in which 
regime change appear to have been forced  due to the pressure of social protest, including 
the Philippines in 2001, Ukraine during the Orange Revolution, and Egypt and Tunisia 
during the Arab Spring.  
It is also important to remember that social protest has a prolonged effect on the 
economy. The Arab Spring cost approximately 100 billion dollars in loss of exports and 
imports, and caused the deadlock of many economic activities.8 During the London riots 
in 2011, insurance companies suffered over 200 million dollars in losses resulting from 
looting and damage. Social protests are complex events, involving mass action that seems 
to be coordinated within the crowds. Law enforcement agencies face enormous 
difficulties when attempting to quell violent social protests through brute force and lethal 
strategies. It becomes colossally difficult for police to contain and control the crowds 
when social protests involve over hundreds of thousands of people. Consequently, it is 
vital to understand how crowds are pulled together and what mechanism they use during 
political upheavals and mass social protests. Thus, this research will contribute to a better 
understanding of how increased Internet penetration in a country has an effect on the 
frequency of social protests. 
6. Jan H. Pierskalla and Florian M.Hollenbach., “Technology and Collective Action: The Effect of Cell 
Phone Coverage on Political Violence in Africa,” American Political Science Review 107, no. 2 (2013): 
220.                                                                                                                        
7. Michael Bratton and Richard Houessou, “Demand for Democracy is Rising in Africa, but most 
Political Leaders Fail to Deliver,” Afrobarometer 11 (2014): 6.                                                                                                                       
8. Sonia Farid, “Arab Spring Losses Reach 100 Billion Dollars,” Alarabiya NewsDec 14, 2011.                                                                                                                      
http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/12/14/182585.html.   
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Contemporary studies have generally focused on only one case study at a time 
when trying to understand the role of social media during social protests. For instance, 
Sean Aday, Henry Farell, Marc Lynch, John Sides, and Deen Freelon found that, during 
the Arab Spring, new media did not play a direct role in the protest but rather more had a 
informative role in spreading news outside the region.9 By contrast, Philip Howard and 
Muzammil Hussain argue that digital media changed the tactics of demonstration 
movements and that social media played a direct role in the Arab Spring.10 In this thesis, 
I will argue that in order to resolve this debate, it is important to look at numerous cases 
over a broad period of time and wide geographic space. This thesis will look at a broad 
sample of countries in Africa and to assess how increased in Internet penetration has 
affected the frequency of social protest.  
The number of Internet users is ever increasing, and new users join social media 
platforms every second. The social network that exists in the virtual world is a strong 
force that can shape political actions. Social media has become a vehicle to organize 
social protest; more and more activists and social movement organizations use web pages 
and social media to achieve their objectives. Therefore, it is imperative to study the 
relationship between increased Internet penetration and social protests in Africa. 
The purpose of this thesis is to answer the research question: how do the 
prevalence social media technologies affect the dynamics of social protest in Africa? 
Drawing on data from African countries from 1992 to 2012, I estimate the effects of 
increased Internet penetration on social protests. My hypothesis theorizes that a higher 
level of Internet penetration over time tends to increase the frequency of social protests. 
The methodology that I will employ to investigate this hypothesis is a mix of 
theoretical and empirical analysis. The theoretical aspect explores the body of literature 
on the role of social media in social protest. While the recent Arab uprisings have 
highlighted the importance of communication technologies, there still exist conflicting 
9. Sean Aday et al., “New Media and Conflict After the Arab Spring,” Washington, DC: United States 
Institute of Peace (2012): 21.    
10. Philip N. Howard and Muzammil M. Hussain, “The Role of Digital Media,” Journal of Democracy 
22, no. 3 (2011): 48.   
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views on the role of social media in social protest. The empirical analysis, which is the 
focal point of this thesis, involves collection, interpretation, and evaluation of data that 
measure the proportionate increase in Internet penetration across 24 African countries. 
Using this percentage as the independent variable and the frequency of social protest as 
the dependent variable, a regression analysis will be run to determine whether a 
significant relation exists between these factors, while controlling for a number of 
potential confounding factors. The goal of this thesis is to show policy makers how 
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 LITERATURE REVIEW 
The Internet has revamped politics and media-related industries, and the whole 
world’s activities now are highly dependent on digital traffic. Scholars of economics 
argue that this new technology has had beneficial effects on the economy. In contrast, 
many criminal organizations have also modernized their operational strategies through 
the Internet. For instance, Wong and Brown classify actors that used Internet for criminal 
activities as “e-bandits” defying the law and regulations of the state.11 Additionally, 
technology has retooled the way protest movements are organized. Traditional methods 
of using placards and leaflets can cause considerable coordination problems, whereas the 
new platforms publicize activities in a better way, and at the same time, can preserve 
anonymity.  
Social protest may be an indication that the people are not satisfied with the ruling 
regime. Expressing their discontent, the governed can mobilize huge crowds to protest 
against the governing class. During the Arab Spring millions of Tunisians and Egyptians 
poured into the streets and peacefully demanded change.12 However, it is important to 
remember that protest also requires a whole range of organizational structure, planning, 
resources, and strategies to pull huge crowds together to start an uprising.  
Many scholars have studied social protests from different angles. Some are 
interested in law enforcement responses to social protest, while others look at the 
dynamics of the crowds and the roles of social media in protests. This literature review 
examines the scholarly contributions concerning the role of social media in protest. There 
are two poles to the debate. Cyber ‘skeptics’ argue that social media assists only to share 
information in organizing and coordinating aspects of social protests. In contrast, cyber 
‘enthusiasts’ argue that social media has a direct role in magnifying the size of the 
crowds in social protests. This review has three parts. The first part explains the building 
blocks of social media. The second part examines the different debates about the role of 
11. Wendy H. Wong and Peter A. Brown, “E-Bandits in Global Activism: WikiLeaks, Anonymous, 
and the Politics of no One,” Perspectives on Politics 11, no. 4 (2013): 1016.                                                                                                                     
12. Aday et al., “New Media and Conflict After the Arab Spring,” 3.                                                                                                                  
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social media in protests. Finally, it concludes by exploring the theoretical frameworks 
supporting this research.  
 COMPONENTS OF SOCIAL MEDIA 
Andreas Kaplan and Michael Haenlein define social media as “a group of 
Internet-based applications that build on the ideological and technological foundations of 
Web 2.0 and that allow the creation and exchange of user generated content.”13 
Individuals are now socialized in the digital world by sharing information between 
families, friends, and acquaintances. Over time they build a social network. Users are 
connected through numerous platforms, such as Facebook, My Space, YouTube, and now 
Twitter, to spread news, and buy new products online. In fact, Teresa Correa, Amber 
Hinsley, and Homero Gil de Zuniga find that more than 75 percent of adults and over 93 
percent of teenagers use the Internet as a social networking tool.14  
Microblogging is a new form of Internet-based application, which allows users to 
exchange small elements, such as short sentences, real-time video images, and video 
links. Andreas Kaplan and Michael Haenlein argue that “Twitter is undoubtedly the most 
popular member of a larger group of Internet-based applications called micro-blogs.”15 
Such tools allow rapid information flows between the users. In his doctoral dissertation, 
Cameron Alexander Marlow shows how information is spread among friends, families, 
and acquaintances within a network, similar to the propagation of a disease that is spread 
in society, which he terms a “media contagion,” and the diffusion of information flows 
within a network and between networks in a social space.16 Additionally, Haewoon 
Kwak, Changhyun Lee, Hosung Park, and Sue Moon found that the recipients of the 
tweets are likely to spread the information by “retweeting” to other audiences. The 
13. Andreas M. Kaplan and Michael Haenlein, “Users of the World, Unite! the Challenges and 
Opportunities of Social Media,” Business Horizons 53, no. 1 (2010): 61.                                                                                                                   
14. Teresa Correa, Amber Willard Hinsley and Homero Gil De Zuniga, “Who Interacts on the 
Web?:The Intersection of Users’ Personality and Social Media Use,” Computers in Human Behavior 26, 
no. 2 (2010): 1.                                                                                                                 
15. Andreas M. Kaplan and Michael Haenlein, “The Early Bird Catches the News: Nine Things You 
should Know about Micro-Blogging,” Business Horizons 54, no. 2 (2011): 106.                                                                                                                
16. Cameron Alexander Marlow, The Structural Determinants of Media Contagion. (Dissertation, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2005), 16.                                                                                                             
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authors argue that “retweet[ing] is an effective means to relay the information beyond 
adjacent neighbors.”17  If thousands of users are spreading news about social protest in a 
particular area, Twitter can highlight the news through the trending topics thereby it 
amplifying the spread of information to all users.18 It is for this reason, that firms and 
businesses increasingly recognize social media as an important tool that can influence 
opinions. As Jan Kietzman, Kristopher Hermkens, Ian McCarthy, and Bruno Silvestre 
demonstrate, it is essential for firms and managers to understand the functional blocks of 
social media in order to be able to monitor a firm’s reputation, the quality of service 
provided, and get feedback about products.19 
In similar ways, the Internet provides overwhelming advantages to social 
movement organizations for inviting crowds to participate in protests, rallies, and 
peaceful marches. Traditional means of spreading information for a gathering, such as 
local networks, flyers, or word of mouth, are slow and inefficient. In contrast, social 
media and Internet technologies allow users and activists to communicate, coordinate, 
and share information at relatively low costs even within larger crowds.20 For instance, 
Jenifer Earl and Katrina Kimport demonstrate how United for Peace and Justice used the 
Internet to gather over 400,000 people for a rally and march against the war in Iraq in 
January 2007.21 It thus seems that when activists leverage the benefits of the Internet 
effectively, they may be able to gather crowds more easily. 
 VIEWS ON THE ROLE OF SOCIAL MEDIA IN CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 
Sometimes, it is difficult to assess the success or failure of social protests and 
their relationship with social media, and many scholars have argued that these platforms 
cannot be used to start a revolution. For instance, Juan Raul Escobar demonstrates in a 
17. Haewoon Kwak et al., “What is Twitter, a Social Network Or a News Media?” in Proceedings of 
the 19th International Conference on World Wide Web, ed. ACMACM, 2010): 598.                                                                                       
18. Ibid., 597. 
19. Jan H. Kietzmann et al., “Social Media? Get Serious! Understanding the Functional Building 
Blocks of Social Media,” Business Horizons 54, no. 3 (2011): 250.                                                                                    
20. Jennifer Earl and Katrina Kimport, Digitally Enabled Social Change: Activism in the Internet Age 
(Mit Press, 2011): 10.                                                                                   
21. Ibid., 3.  
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study on Colombia that Twitter was not effective for promoting revolution, as it was 
difficult to build a network therein and coordinate action. However, because his study 
focuses primarily on Colombia, its results may be difficult to generalize in regard other 
places. In Colombia, Internet penetration is very low and only 12 percent of the 
population had access to the Internet in 2011.22 
Along similar lines, Jon B. Alterman argues that social media did not in any way 
help in the Arab Spring. According to his argument, there was a transition from an 
authoritarian to a more liberal system of government in the Middle-East, which the author 
termed a “process in democratization.”23 Furthermore, he argues that Twitter and 
Facebook played a meager role, while traditional media such as TV played a decisive role 
in the protest. Additionally, the author states that the difficult economic conditions in 
Egypt, especially the high rate of unemployment among the youth, were the key factors 
which generated so many labor strikes in Egypt since 2010.24 However, this argument 
fails to demonstrate how such large numbers of people came together or how they were 
informed of and encouraged to participate in the strikes. Collective action is crucial in 
social protests, and this action can only be achieved through active communication 
among the different groups in the crowds. 
Sean Aday, Henry Farell, Marc Lynch, John Sides, and Dean Freelon also find 
little evidence that the new media play a direct role in organizing protest, but find rather 
that they function primarily to inform international audiences and mainstream media. The 
authors use a qualitative approach to study the role of new media such as Twitter in the 
Arab Spring, but conclude that there are deep methodological challenges to 
demonstrating a causal relationship between new media and social protests.25 
Furthermore, Emma Tonkin, Heather Pfeiffer, and Greg Tourte reaffirm the difficulty of 
laying blame on social media during the London riots, mostly because of the challenges 
22. Juan Raúl Escobar, “The Revolution Will Not be Tweeted” (Master’s thesis, Institute of Social 
Studies, The Hague, Netherlands, 2009): 21.   
23. Jon B. Alterman, “The Revolution Will Not be Tweeted,” in Refocusing on Egypt, Vol. 34 (Taylor 
& Francis, 2011): 104.                                                                              
24. Ibid., 108.   
25. Aday et al., “New Media and Conflict After the Arab Spring,” 174  
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of looking at the data, and the difficulties of assessing the actual influence of a particular 
message.26 Similarly, Alex Burns and Ben Eltham studied the roles of social media 
during Iran’s 2009 election crisis and found that Twitter was unable to bring 
revolutionary change in regime. Most of the Twitter users were being targeted and 
brutalized by the paramilitary forces, and some were even killed.27 In addition, Navid 
Hassanpour argues that it was the disruption of the communication network by the 
Egyptian authorities that infuriated the population and further accelerated the 
mobilization of protests. Moreover, the information vacuum caused by cutting the 
Internet was filled by other means of communication—radio, mobile phones, and SMS.28 
In contrast, some scholars believe that social media is an effective tool and it is 
used by many organizations to achieve their objectives. According to these researchers, 
social media can be an effective vehicle for organizing protests, as it reinforces 
democratic values and allows people to share vital information about government 
activities. Thus, users or even activists perform the role of a watchdog for the population 
through social media. Furthermore, real-time news spreads at great speed between 
networks, linking people and organizations in the virtual world more easily. For instance, 
Philip Howard and Muzammil Hussian argue that during the Arab Spring, social media 
such as Facebook and Twitter made the key difference in organizing such massive and 
sustained demonstrations. According to the authors, “it was not oppression and police 
brutality that were the catalyst, which ignited popular protest, but the diffusion of news 
about police beating Mohamed Bouazizi or Khaled Said by networks of families, friends, 
and then strangers.”29 Moreover, when Dana Fisher, Kevein Stanley, David Berman, and 
Gina Neff conducted a survey and collected data from five protest events in three 
26. Emma Tonkin, Heather D. Pfeiffer and Greg Tourte, “Twitter, Information Sharing and the London 
Riots?” Bulletin of the American Society for Information Science and Technology 38, no. 2 (2012): 55.                                                                          
27. Alex Burns and Ben Eltham, “Twitter Free Iran: An Evaluation of Twitter’s Role in Public 
Diplomacy and Information Operations in Iran’s 2009 Election Crisis” (Communications Policy & 
Research Forum, University of Technology, Sydney, Nov 19–20, 2009). 
28. Navid Hassanpour, “Media Disruption Exacerbates Revolutionary Unrest: Evidence from 
Mubarak’s Natural Experiment,” APSA 2011 Annual Meeting Paper (2011): 2. 
29. Howard and Hussain, “The Role of Digital Media,” 43.                                                                
 11 
                                                 
countries, they found that 29 percent of the individuals participating in the protest learnt 
of it through their social network.30 
To develop a more thorough understanding of how this process operates, this 
thesis will draw on the tenets of social movement theory to explain crowd behavior and 
collective action. Individual and collective behaviors in social protests are complex. 
Pamela E. Oliver defines social movements as “large and complex sets of collective 
events oriented toward some general social change.”31 Crowds in social protests can be 
divided into three groups: bystanders, active participants, and the hard core. Aldon 
Morris and Carol Mueller argue that some people participate in protests because they care 
about certain issues and they are ready to incur some personal costs in order to achieve 
their goals.32 Proponents of social movement theory argue that while individuals in 
crowds are sometimes engaged in purely individual actions, and they may also be 
engaging in fundamentally collective behaviors.33 This perspective claims that 
movements form because of the social grievances existing in society. 
In contrast, resource mobilization theory claims that grievances are secondary 
factors for social movements to form, and that the most important element is the 
availability of resources, especially cadres, and organizing facilities that support the 
social movement.34 Along these lines, J. Craig Jenkins argues that “mobilization is a 
process by which a group secures collective control over the resources needed for 
collective action.”35 Resources such as money, recruits, and means of communication are 
crucial to sustaining a social movement. Moreover, the author argues that the ability to 
mobilize huge crowds largely depends on a group sharing distinct identities, strong social 
30. Dana R. Fisher et al., “How do Organizations Matter? Mobilization and Support for Participants at 
Five Globalization Protests,” Social Problems 52, no. 1 (2005): 112.                                                             
31. Pamela E. Oliver, “Bringing the Crowd Back in: The Nonorganizational Elements of Social 
Movements,” Research in Social Movements, Conflict and Change 11, no. 1989 (1989): 4.                                                              
32. Aldon D. Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller, Frontiers in Social Movement Theory (Yale 
University Press, 1992): 252.                                                            
33. Clark McPhail and Ronald T. Wohlstein, “Individual and Collective Behaviors within Gatherings, 
Demonstrations, and Riots,” Annual Review of Sociology (1983): 580.                                                      
34. J. Craig Jenkins, “Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements,” Annual 
Review of Sociology 9 (1983): 530.                                                                                                                                 
35. Ibid., 532.  
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ties, and solid preexisting group organization.36 It thus seems possible that media 
technologies within the social movement could act as a locomotive that connects 
individuals, and thereby empowers the mobilization of larger and more frequent protest 
activities. 
 INTERNET PENETRATION IN AFRICA 
Africa has known remarkable growth in digital communication as displayed by 
the graph in Figure 1. This growth has had a transformative effect on the way business is 
conducted. According to the Pew Research Global Attitudes Project “Emerging Nations 
Embrace Internet, Mobile Technology,” it is estimated that 77 percent of Internet users in 
Africa are present on social media.37 Poor infrastructure for landline telephones has 
forced many users to shift to mobile technology and the cell phone market is 
skyrocketing. In addition, the use of smartphones is gaining a strong foothold.38 In many 
ways the spread of Internet access appear to have a beneficial effect on the African 
economic and political sphere. Many scholars argue that the use of ICT, in particular 
social media, acts as a vanguard and monitor for the whole range of government actions, 
which ultimately reinforces transparency and acts as an anti-corruption tool for 
societies.39   
 
36. Ibid., 538.   
37. Pew Research Center, Emerging Nations Embrace Internet, Mobile Technology: Cell Phones 
nearly Ubiquitous in Many CountriesGlobal Attitudes Project, 2014.                                                                                                                              
38. Ibid., 4. 
39. John C. Bertot, Paul T. Jaeger and Justin M. Grimes, “Using ICTs to Create a Culture of 
Transparency: E-Government and Social Media as Openness and Anti-Corruption Tools for Societies,” 
Government Information Quarterly 27, no. 3 (2010): 269.                                                                                                                                    
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Figure 1. Percentage of individuals using the Internet in Africa. 
While social media has facilitated and improved economic activity and promoted 
e-government in Africa, the ICT revolution has additionally promoted an upsurge in 
many illegal activities. Pierskalla and Hollenbach argue that increased cell phone use in 
Africa has helped to address the problem of coordination for violent collective action, and 
show that the rise in cell phone use has increased the probability of violent conflict in 
Africa.40 
The Arab Spring has reinvigorated the role of social media as a facilitator to 
organize social protests, and has drawn the attention of many scholars and researchers. 
As Malcom Malcom Gladwell illustrates in his 2010 study, social media itself cannot 
create a revolution, because users in the network have weak ties. Instead, he argues it is 
the degree of personal connection between activists, which are the strong ties that matters 
to generate committed collective action.41 In contrast, Alexandra Segerberg and W. 
40. Pierskalla and Florian M.Hollenbach., “Technology and Collective Action: The Effect of Cell 
Phone Coverage on Political Violence in Africa,” 220.                                 
41. Malcolm Gladwell, “Small Change: Why the Revolution Will Not be Tweeted,” The New Yorker, 
























                                                 
Lance Bennett  shows analytical weaknesses in Malcom Gladwell’s study and strongly 
contend that social media, in particular Twitter act as networking agents in the context in 
which it operates, and facilitates coherence, sustainability, and effective associated 
collection, thus are indicative of developing collective action.42 Social media, in fact, 
addresses the coordination problems faced by activists and organizers who rely heavily 
on collective action within the population. Thus, crowds are much stronger and ready to 
face the superior power of the state. Additionally, social media such as Twitter stream has 
an effect of connecting various networks, actors, and locations in a protest space, which 
magnifies the size of the audience focused on a particular social protest.43  
 
42. Alexandra Segerberg and W. Lance Bennett, “Social Media and the Organization of Collective 
Action: Using Twitter to Explore the Ecologies of Two Climate Change Protests,” Communication Review 
14, no. 3 (2011): 201.                                                                                                                                
43. Ibid., 202. 
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The previous chapter explores the theoretical foundation; this chapter investigates 
the empirical data which constitutes a key part of this thesis. This data enables us to test 
the hypothesis; increased Internet use increases social protests in Africa. The African 
continent provides a rich agglomeration of spatial and temporal variation that does not 
exist in other parts of the world, in addition to representing a major hotspot of ethnic 
violence and political conflict. In order to test this hypothesis I gathered cross-sectional 
time-series data from existing databases covering a period of 20 years, between 1992 and 
2012. This data is drawn from 54 countries in Africa as listed in the appendix. This 
temporal period was chosen to cover the global development of Internet technology and 
the rapid expansion of social media, while also providing a sizable data sample for 
regression analysis.  
 INDEPENDENT VARIABLE 
At this stage, it is also important to identify the variables for our analysis. The key 
independent variable will be the percentage of individuals within a country using the 
Internet, proportionate to the total population. This data is drawn from the International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU), which maintains datasets for the whole ICT sector 
from 193 countries and over 700 private sectors and academic institutions.44  
 DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
The main dependent variable effects the frequency of social protests and riots 
occurring in these countries, using data collected from the Social Conflict in Africa 
Database, which records social conflict events from 1990 to 2012.45 For our analysis the 
total number of protests that have occurred in a country is counted on a yearly basis. The 
44. “ITU: Committed to Connecting the World.” ITU, http://www.itu.int/en/Pages/default.aspx . ITU 
collects ICT statistics for 200 economies and over 100 indicators; ICT statistics, including on broadband, 
Internet use, mobile-cellular and mobile-broadband networks 
45. Cullen S. Hendrix and Idean Salehyan, “Social Conflict in Africa Database,” Robert S. Strauss 
Center for International Security and Law, https://www.strausscenter.org/scad.html. 
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Social Conflict Database provides the start dates and end dates of a protest. Although a 
protest can last for more than one day, in our counting system it is coded as one protest.  
 CONTROL VARIABLES 
Additionally, it is important to identify the control variables that must be included 
in the analysis to account for other factors that may affect the frequency of social 
protests. Scholars have emphasized that structural factors may contribute to the 
occurrence of internal conflicts and regime stability. Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and 
Dominic Rohner demonstrate the socioeconomic factors, such as poverty, inequalities, 
and ethnic fractionalization that motivate parties engaging in conflicts. Their findings are 
significant to consider in regard to economic variables: the level, growth, and structure of 
income are key determinants affecting the propensity of individuals to engage in 
violence.46 The control variables that have been identified are: wealth as captured by 
GDP Per capita Income, Inflation rates, Economic Growth, Population, 
Unemployment, Regime Types, and Ethnic Diversity. The GDP Per capita income is 
predicted to negatively affect the likelihood of protests. Similarly, Economic Growth is 
included in the model, as it is commonly believed that conditions of strong economic 
growth are less likely to motivate people to protest against a regime. Scholars have also 
argued that a larger population is more difficult for the state to control and increases the 
potential for protests. Similarly, James Fearon and David Laitin show that “the estimated 
risk of civil war over the course of a decade is greater for a country with a larger 
population.”47  Along the same lines, in a World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, 
Patrick Barron, Kai Kaiser, and Menno Pradhan argue that there is a directly relationship 
between unemployment and local conflict in Indonesia.48 
Unemployment provides the opportunities for groups to participate in collective 
action and express their grievances toward the state. A high unemployment rate is 
46. Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler and Dominic Rohner, “Beyond Greed and Grievance: Feasibility and 
Civil War,” Oxford Economic Papers 61, no. 1 (2009): 20.                                                                                                                                 
47. James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American Political 
Science Review 97, no. 1 (2003), 75–90.: 85.    
48. Patrick Barron, Kai Kaiser and Menno Pradhan, Local Conflict in Indonesia: Measuring Incidence 
and Identifying Patterns, Policy Research Working Paper 3384 (The World Bank, August 2004).                                                                                                                             
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expected to generate more social conflict as opposed to a relatively low percentage of 
unemployed labor. These variables are each measured on a country-year basis using data 
from the World Bank.49 The intent in including these variables is to maximize the 
reliability of the model, while minimizing the biases that could arise from spurious 
correlations. 
In addition to economic variables, it is vital to include social and political 
indicators which arguably affect the possibility of onset of civil unrest. Many scholars 
argue that the type of regime may have a large effect on the possibility for protests. 
Edward Muller and Erich Weede show that “under a totally repressive regime, 
opportunities for collective action will be low and the probability for success will be low. 
In contrast, in a strong democracy the possibilities for collective action will be high and 
the cost for peaceful collective action is much lower than violence.”50  To capture this 
possibility, the Polity IV data set is used to measure the level democracy, on a scale that 
ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic).51 A strong democracy 
is expected to decrease the likelihood of protest.  
For ethnic diversity the commonly used ethno linguistic fractionalization (ELF) 
index based data is used to “measure the probability that two randomly drawn individuals 
in a country are from different ethno linguistic groups.”52 Scholars studying onset of civil 
war and its relationship with ethnic linguistic fractionalization generally argue that a 
society with a high ethnic fractionalization ratio may have a direct relationship with the 
onset of civil war. Based on a similar effort, Randall J. Blimes shows in his model that 
ethnic fractionalization has an indirect effect on civil war; a society with low GDP per 
capita and high ethnic fractionalization has a significant and positive effect on the 
49. World Bank, “The World Bank: Data,” http://data.worldbank.org/country. 
50. Edward N. Muller and Erich Weede, “Cross-National Variation in Political Violence A Rational 
Action Approach,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 34, no. 4 (1990): 646.                                                                                                                             
51. Monty G. Marshall, Keith Jaggers and and Tedd R. Gurr, “Polity IV Project: Political Regime 
Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2012,” Polity IV, http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4x.htm.                                                                                                       
     The Polity IV dataset covers all major, independent states in the global system over the period 
1800–2013 (i.e., states with a total population of 500,000 or more in the most recent year; currently 167 
countries).     
52. Alberto Alesina et al., “Fractionalization,” Journal of Economic Growth 8, no. 2 (2003), 155–194.                                                                                                                             
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probability of civil war.53 We should therefore expect that a high ELF ratio may also 
contribute to the outbreak of social protests. 
Finally, to address the possibility of spurious correlations due to additional 
unmeasured factors, I also include dummy variables (i.e. ‘fixed-effects), for each year 
and each geographic region. Moreover, because our dependent variable is measured as a 
‘count’ variable, which records the total number of protests by country-year, all results 








53. Randall J. Blimes, “The Indirect Effect of Ethnic Heterogeneity on the Likelihood of Civil War 
Onset,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 50, no. 4 (2006): 544.                                                                                                                              
54. John A. Nelder and RJ Baker, Generalized Linear Models (Wiley Online Library, 1972).                                                                                                                         
“Generalized linear models are extensions of traditional regression models that allow the mean to depend 
on the explanatory variables through a link function, and the response variable to be any member of a set of 
distributions called the exponential family (e.g., Normal, Poisson, Binomial).” See 
http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~martin/W2024/R11.pdf. 
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 ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
Figure 2 shows the total number of protests in Africa from 1992 to 2012. The blue 
line shows the aggregate number of protests, and the broken red line indicates the total 
number of protests in all African countries from 1992 to 2012 when Tunisia and Egypt 
are controlled for, there was a lot of protest in the rest of Africa. 
Table 1 shows the results of the multivariate regression, which investigates the 








 Dependent variable: 
  
 Number of protests 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Internet 0.039*** 0.060*** 0.059*** 0.092*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.008) 
     Internet*GDP Per capita    -0.014
*** 
    (0.003) 
     GDP Per capita -0.068** -0.088** -0.162*** -0.026 
 (0.033) (0.038) (0.045) (0.048) 
     Inflation 0.0003 0.0002 0.0004 0.0004 
 (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
     GDP growth -0.059*** -0.040*** -0.024** -0.027*** 
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) 
     Ethnic division  0.732
** 1.484*** 1.366*** 
  (0.292) (0.294) (0.289) 
     Polity IV  0.015 0.022
* 0.020 
  (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) 
     Unemployment 0.026***    
 (0.007)    
     Population 0.0002***    
 (0.00001)    
     as.factor(region)Middle Africa   -0.279 -0.322 
   (0.244) (0.238) 
     as.factor(region)Northern Africa   0.919
*** 0.721*** 
   (0.223) (0.223) 
     as.factor(region)Southern Africa   0.924
*** 0.822*** 
   (0.231) (0.230) 
     as.factor(region)Western Africa   0.287
** 0.281** 
 





     Constant 1.665*** 1.767*** 2.139*** 1.927*** 
 (0.096) (0.225) (0.535) (0.525) 
      Observations 726 707 694 694 
 Note: Standard errors in parentheses *p<0.1;**p<0.05;***p<0.01 
Table 1.   Regression results. 
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Model 1 is the baseline specification; it includes the economic control variables: 
GDP growth, Inflation, GDP per capita, population, and Unemployment. Model 2 adds 
the social and political variables that are likely to affect protests: the types of regime in 
the Polity IV data set and the level of ethnic fractionalization. In addition to the economic 
and social and political control variables, Model 3 includes fixed effect dummy variables 
for each year and region to account for the possibility omitted variable bias. Finally, 
Model 4 adds a multivariate interaction term, Internet * GDP Per capita, to investigate the 
possibility that economic forces condition the impact on Internet penetration, as a 
variable to remove the condition causality between the two variables.  
The key independent variable in the models seems to behave as predicted. The 
Internet’s effect is statistically significant in relation to the onset of protest. In Model 1, 
the coefficient for Internet is strongly positive and significant, giving credence to our 
main hypothesis. In addition, the negative relationships observed for economic variables, 
GDP growth and GDP Per capita, with regard to the outbreak of protests indicate that a 
higher economic growth along with an increase in the GDP per capita may reduce the 
probability of social conflict. However, inflation does not seem to be statistically 
significant in spurring the population to protest. Additionally, in Model 2, when we add 
the social and political variables—ethnic fractionalization and democracy—the 
coefficient for Internet remains positive and statistically significant. The type of regime 
in Africa—autocratic or democratic—generates only weakly significant effect. However, 
the coefficient for ethnic fractionalization is positive and statistically significant, 
indicating that a society with a high level of ethnic fractionalization is more prone to 
instability than a unified society. The relationship between Internet diffusion and the 
likelihood of protests for Model 2 can be visualized by plotting the predicted probability 
of social protest as a function of the level of Internet penetration, while holding all other 
variables constant at their means. 
 23 
 
 Figure 3. Probability of Social Protests as a function of economic variables 
The red line shows predicted probability of protests based on Model two and the 
two grey lines represent the standard errors from Model 2. As depicted by the plot, it is 
estimated that if the level of Internet penetration in Africa increases while holding the 
level of the economic, political and social variables constant, we expect to see an upward 
trend in the level of protests. 
Model 3 adds the geographic regions and years as dummy variables. Based on the 
findings, we can that our key independent variable is unaffected by these additions, 
indicating that the results are unlikely to have been driven by unmeasured differences 
between years or regions.  
To examine the possibility of conditional effects, Model 4 includes a 
multiplicative interaction term, Internet * per capita GDP combined with the economic, 
social, and political controls from the previous models. The significant negative 
coefficient for the interaction terms indicates that when wealth is low, Internet has a 
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strong and positive effect on protests, but as wealth gets higher the conflict-promoting 
effects of Internet decreases. Given that all the other variables remain constant, if we 
estimate the predicted quantities of social protests occurring based on different levels of 
Internet and GDP Per capita, the result is graphically displayed in Figure 4. Note the 
green and red lines represent the two levels of income per capita; one being the lowest in 
Africa and the other the highest- while the two grey lines depict the standard errors 
derived from Model 4. The results indicate that states able to provide a high GDP per 
capita to their citizens have less to worry about in terms of civil disorders overall, and 
experience less conflict promotion from Internet penetration. 
 
Figure 4. Probability of outbreak of social protests. 
 
  One would also expect the type of regime to be an important factor determining 
the outbreak of civil protest. Human rights abuses and political grievances are the many 
facets of dictatorship that ruin the daily lives of citizens. The results in the analysis, 
however, contradict this argument. Social protests are frequent in democracies as well as 
       GDP Per Capita = 102 
         GDP Per capita   = 8776 
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in autocracies; the results in the models are positive but statistically insignificant. Hence, 
while it is usually believed that dictators or authoritarian rulers will always empower 
their military to curb down potential uprisings, the findings presented here do not support 
such a claim.  
The estimates for ethnic fractionalization in Model 3 are positive and statistically 
significant. Ethnically dominant groups play key roles in civil war, as Benjamin Smith 
shows in a study of oil wealth, high levels of ethnic diversity increases the risk of civil 
war, especially in oil-rich countries.55 By contrast, James Fearon and David Laitin argue 
that ethic fractionalization barely has any effect on civil war. Rather, they claim, it is 
poverty, a large population, and instability that favor the outbreak of civil war.56 
Interestingly, our findings seem to echo the view that ethnic fractionalization matters 
greatly for the outbreak of civil unrest.  
Surprisingly, in a unified society the possibility for social protest is higher than in 
a society with high ethnic fractionalization. This finding seems to give credence to Model 
3, where we note that the Northern African Region coefficient is .91 percent and 
statistically significant, and this region is composed of an Arab majority group. Social 
identity and group solidarity favor collective action, and these ingredients matter in social 




55. Benjamin Smith, “Oil Wealth and Regime Survival in the Developing World, 1960–1999,” 
American Journal of Political Science 48, no. 2 (2004): 240.                                                                                                                              
56. Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” 88.                                                                                                                              
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 CONCLUSION 
This thesis has investigated the effects of the increased percentage of individuals 
using the Internet in Africa upon the number of social protests, and the findings are 
important in many aspects. First, the results in the analysis give credence to our 
hypothesis that Internet usage has a direct relationship with social protest. Second, the 
results show that economic characteristics such as the level of income, unemployment, 
and growth are key determinants that promote stability and are also predictors of the risk 
of civil unrest. The results thus indicate that, while grievances are the underlying reason 
for people to rebel against the state, the availability of resources is crucial to triggering 
mass mobilization.  
New technology allows mobile Internet users to interact more and more through 
the social media platforms; this digital growth rate will create a new dynamic in the 
socio-political environment. The digital technology revolution reduces information 
asymmetry in isolated corners, and also improves collective action among protestors 
throughout cities, countries, and regions. More users in Africa are joining social media 
sites, and as the future seems promising, major private companies are investing and 
expanding the communications network. This growth will undeniably improve many 
aspects of African life and it will also enable new conflicts beyond state control. 
Recent studies have shown interest in looking beyond social protest at the use of 
social media in supporting special operations in revolutionary environments.57 Social 
media are powerful tools that can shape and influence the behavior of a population from 
outside the targeted country. New conflicts emerge as non-state actors rely heavily on 
social media to run their propaganda campaigns, recruit new followers, and instigate 
supporters to rise up against the state. Many terrorist groups dissipate their venomous 
slogans through the new social media platforms. Unfortunately, technology has created 
new avenues for the bad guys to leverage and exploit.  
57. Kirk A. Duncan, “Assessing the use of Social Media in a Revolutionary Environment” (Master’s 
thesis, Naval Postgraduate School), 1–175. 
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In this research we provided evidence that when certain economic conditions 
exist- low income, low economic growth, and unemployment - Internet use has a direct 
relationship with the likelihood of social protest. These results may be of interest for 
policy makers. For instance, instead of focusing on hard power to quell disorder, states 
should rely on all forms of communication technology as a tool to expand their control 
and influence the population in terms of welcoming suggestions, acknowledging citizens’ 
value and achievement, monitoring public opinion, and responding to concerns. The 
expansion of Internet accessibility to Africa will most likely generate positive economic 
activity in the long run, but it will also create a more connected environment, which is 
favorable for both the states and other actors in the arena. The spread of democracy, 
fighting corruption, and tolerance for ethnic minorities are measures that are likely to 
reduce conflicts, but they should be accompanied by policies that increase the level of 
income of citizens. The prevalence of social conflicts in Africa is indicative of the 
grievances that exist in society. The Internet is a valuable tool that has become the eye 
and ears of the weak, corrupt governments that continue to use harsh measures against its 
their populations are most likely to face more uprisings.    
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APPENDIX. COUNTRY LIST 





5. Burkina Faso 
6. Burundi 
7. Cameroon 
8. Cape Verde 
9. Central African 
10. Republic Chad 
11. Comoros 
12. Congo 
13. Congo Democratic 
14. Ivory Coast 
15. Djibouti 
16. Egypt 

























41. St. Helena 
42. St. Tome & Principe 
43. Senegal 
44. Sierra Leona 
45. Somalia 
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